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Mechanism design
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#	Item
151	Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions Paul D¨ utting1,? , Monika Henzinger2,?? , and Martin Starnberger2,?? 1 Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: English - Date: 2013-09-29 17:50:14 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction First-price sealed-bid auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Valuation Revelation principle
152	Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: agent.inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp Language: English - Date: 2016-07-21 01:26:20 Game theory Mechanism design Auctions Auction theory Social choice theory VickreyClarkeGroves auction Combinatory logic Auction Strategyproofness Monotonicity Mode Norm
153	Economics Letters – 73 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation ☆ Philippe Jehiel a,b , Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn c , Benny Moldovanu d,⁎, William R. Zame e Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2013-10-01 17:14:33 Game theory Auction theory Vickrey auction Mechanism design Nash equilibrium
154	Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan ∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.huji.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 11:29:27 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Social choice theory Algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Algorithmic Combinatorial auction Algorithm Auction Valuation
155	c Copyright 2009 by Benjamin E. Hermalin. All rights reserved. Contents List of Tables Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.haas.berkeley.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-01-09 18:06:05 Marketing Pricing Price discrimination Monopoly Screening Mechanism design Two-part tariff Pricing strategies
156	Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗ Google Inc., Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Virtual valuation Expected utility hypothesis Expected value Revenue equivalence
157	Dirk Bergemann Joan Feigenbaum Yale University Economics and Computation Computer Scienceand Economics Add to Reading List Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-12-08 16:57:31 Game theory Mechanism design Auction theory First-price sealed-bid auction Nash equilibrium Sequential auction Folk theorem
158	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 14, 2013 Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:31:05 Auction theory Mechanism design Game theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction Single-parameter utility English auction Revelation principle Spectrum auction
159	Challenges in Algorithmic Mechanism Design THÈSE NOPRÉSENTÉE le 26 avril 2013 À LA FACULTÉ INFORMATIQUE ET COMMUNICATIONS Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: French - Date: 2013-05-06 07:36:51
160	Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first Add to Reading List Source URL: web.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2016-08-08 16:20:04 Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Game theory Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Matroid Linear programming Random-sampling mechanism

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